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Abstract
Anil Gupta’s Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry provides an impressive and novel account of rational
justification based on conscious experience which is used as a foundation for a new theory of empiricism. In
this critical notice, I argue that Gupta’s project is fascinating, but is often hampered by a lack of sufficient
philosophical justification and clarity regarding some essential features of his project, as well as a lack of
engagement with relevant scientific domains that would directly bear on it, such as computational
neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive psychology. This limits the sort of logical inquiry
available to him in problematic ways.
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Anil Gupta’s Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry1 is an impressively ambitious philosophical
endeavor. Not content merely to provide a logical analysis of consciousness, empiricism, language,
or rationality, it attempts to weave them all together and, in the process, offer up an entirely new and
unique version of empiricism: reformed empiricism. Put simply, Gupta is interested in showing
how our conscious experiences of the world can be used to provide rational justification for our
beliefs and judgments, without assuming either that conscious experience somehow provides us
with special propositional knowledge, or assuming that our experiences are entirely structured by
our preexisting set of concepts and beliefs.
Unlikemany traditional views of empiricism,Gupta’s account argues that concepts are not derived
directly from experience, nor does experience contain content of any kind. Instead, experience always
works in conjunctionwith a preexisting set of beliefs, concepts, and judgments held by an agent (their
preexisting “view” of the world) to allow for the formation of new rationally justified beliefs. Thus, the
appearancesmanifest to us in conscious experience provide us only with ameans of transitioning to a
rational belief or judgment based on the preexisting view we have. The exact same conscious
experience could thus rationally justify any number of radically different beliefs depending on the
preexisting view of the agent. Conscious experience connects us to the world in a direct manner, but
does not directly contribute to the content of our judgments in doing so.
To illustrate, take Thomas Kuhn’s example of how the same observations have been used to
justify different theories in the history of science:
During the seventeenth century, when their research was guided by one or another effluvium
theory, electricians repeatedly saw chaff particles rebound from, or fall off, the electrified
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
1All folio references cited for this book are to this edition: Gupta, Anil. 2019. Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2020), 1–13
doi:10.1017/can.2020.32
bodies that had attracted them. At least that is what seventeenth-century observers said they
saw, and we have no more reason to doubt their reports of perception than our own. Placed
before the same apparatus, a modern observer would see electrostatic repulsion (rather than
mechanical or gravitational rebounding). (1976, 138)
Kuhn concludes from this that our observations are always theory laden. In other words, he argues
that our conscious experiences of the world are partially structured by our background theories,
beliefs, and judgments. Gupta wants to draw a very different conclusion from these historical cases.
He denies Kuhn’s claim that the conscious experience itself is somehow intertwined with thought
and judgment. Instead, it is merely the case that the same conscious experience can be used to
transition to different rational judgments based on the differing views of the scientists. For those
working in the seventeenth century, the conclusion that they are observing effluvium is indeed a
rationally justified belief given their preexisting view and the appearances consciously presented to
them. Meanwhile modern observers, when presented with the identical conscious experience,
would be rationally justified in believing they are witnessing electrostatic repulsion. Conscious
experience itself does not contain content—theory laden or otherwise—which lends support to one
theory or the other, but it does allow a scientist to determine which judgments would be rational
given a background view.
While the broad strokes of this project are fascinating and often compelling, it is in the fine
details where most of my criticisms lie. I found myself often agreeing with Gupta’s commitment to
the idea that the rationality of a judgment is partially determined by the preexisting view of the
agent, and that conscious experience can often be part of the process by which we transition from
preexisting views to novel rational judgments without the aid of some sort of special propositional
“given” (more on that below). But I foundmyself partingways withGupta when he attempts to flesh
out the details of his story. His account of what consciousness is (i.e., something distinct from
content, judgment, and representation) and the very specific role it plays in rational justification are
problematic in a number of ways. It should be noted that my analysis is informed by my strong
naturalist leanings; leanings which Gupta deliberately resists. I will, however, attempt to demon-
strate that this resistance to naturalism limits Gupta’s ability to engage in effective logical inquiry by
cutting him off from the conceptual tools and resources provided by relevant scientific domains (for
a different sort of worry regarding Gupta’s resistance to naturalism, see also Barwich 2019).
My goal in this critical notice is to provide an overview of Gupta’s project in the book, and to
explain why I remain unconvinced by the details of the story he tells. This I will do in four sections.
In the first section, I provide a very general outline of how the book proceeds and of his general
project. In section two, I outline my first major concern with Gupta’s account: specifically, that
insufficient detail and justification has been provided for many of his critical distinctions and
definitions in the book, often resulting in a lack of clarity and a feeling that some of his distinctions
are ad hoc. In section 3, I turn to my second and more serious concern: that Gupta’s lack of
engagement with the empirical research in cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology
significantly constrains his project. His decision to ignore the insights provided by the sciences
of the mind is a costly one, as it severely limits the ways in which he conceptualizes, classifies, and
theorizes about our mental lives. Domains such as computational neuroscience, cognitive psychol-
ogy, and cognitive neuroscience are important not simply because they provide empirical data, or
because they can “fill in” the mechanistic details of our philosophical theories, but because they
bring with them entirely different conceptual resources and tools for thinking about themind. They
force us to radically reinterpret and reevaluate the sort of classifications that earlier philosophers
have taken for granted, and which Gupta likewise accepts without much justification. Lastly, in
section 4, I explore the implications that this has for Gupta’s project and highlight how the
conceptual tools provided by the cognitive sciences suggest a far messier and more complicated
story regarding the relation between conscious experience, rational judgment, and empiricism than
the kind Gupta presents.
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1. Overview of the book
The relationship between conscious experience, the world, and our rational judgments of it is at the
center of Gupta’s project. As such, the first few chapters of the book are dedicated to an in-depth
analysis of previous philosophical attempts to understand such relationships with a particular focus on
the works of Bertrand Russell andWilfred Sellars. Gupta’s exploration of Russell and Sellars’s work is
done with both great reverence and care, as is his exploration of other key philosophical views
developed in analytic philosophy during the twentieth century. It can often be a joy to explore these
philosophical views alongwithGupta as he carefully dissects the various pros and cons of each position.
Gupta argues that traditional empiricist attempts to use conscious experience as a means of
providing rational support for our perceptual judgments typically involved assuming that conscious
experience provides us with some sort of pure unmediated access to the conceptual structure of
reality. In this camp, we have Russell’s notion of direct acquaintance, and more recent theories of
direct realism and naïve realism. Gupta nicely outlines what he takes to be the advantages afforded
by such accounts, as well as his worries regarding them. His analysis is a rich one, full of details and
insights regarding the numerous problems these accounts face, and it is worth briefly mentioning
one or two of them here. Given Gupta’s interest in providing an account of the nature of rational
justification, he argues that these theories fail to satisfactorily account for the rationality of a given
perceptual judgment. He argues that according to these accounts,
. . . themere existence of an experiential representation can confer a particular rational standing
(prima facie justification, knowledge, and so on) on the judgment that P. But how can such a
wonderful thing happen? With other exercises of conceptual capacities (in, e.g., willing and
thinking), we find nothing of the sort. The mere fact that one wills that P or thinks that P does
not confer any such status on one’s judgment that P.What is it about the exercise of conceptual
capacities in experience that endows it with such extraordinary rational power? (81)
Put simply, why think that the propositional content supposedly embedded in conscious experience
necessarily explains the rational status of such content? To assume that our perceptual states
somehow have the power to immediately endow their contents with rational justification makes
them seem almost mystical in nature. In other words, the idea that our perceptual experiences
inherently contain some sort of self-justifying propositional content “ends up positing extraordi-
nary and mysterious conceptual states,” and “no plausible account of experience is available that
underwrites it” (84).
On the other hand, we have philosophical views that reverse the relationship between rational
judgment and experience. Instead of conscious experience providing rational support for our
perceptual judgments by way of some mysterious content, it is our rational judgments that provide
support for our experiences. Our experiences are always filtered through, andmade meaningful by,
the set of rationally interconnected beliefs that we bring to bear on them. In this camp we find
Sellars, the coherentists, and the inferentialists. Here, too, Gupta outlines both the virtues and
problems that he feels such views face. In this case, the coherentist strips conscious experience of its
ability to affect the rational status of our beliefs and judgments undermining empiricism in the
process. Worse still, it assumes that we first must have rational beliefs and judgments in order to
explain our conscious experiences. But this, Gupta tells us, gets the order of explanation exactly
backwards. As he puts it, “from the logical point of view, it is rational belief that should be explained
in terms of conscious experience, not the other way around” (75).
Following his detailed historical analysis of the different attempts to connect conscious expe-
rience to both rationality and the world, the book then shifts to focus onGupta’s own account—one
which he feels can incorporate the virtues of the different camps without falling prey to their
weaknesses. The middle of the book focuses primarily on providing a philosophical analysis of the
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phenomenological features of conscious experience and how they are used to ground rational
judgments. Sharp divisions between various mental phenomena and capacities are postulated, with
conscious experience itself taken to be importantly distinct from the contentful, representational,
and inferential processes of the mind. This is what allows Gupta to avoid the problems that plagued
the acquaintance and direct realist accounts of perception. There is no content, no prebuilt
judgments about the world, that are “given” to us by pure experience. In his words:
We can (and should) reject the idea that experience yields a special set of privileged concepts
that serves as the foundation for all other empirical concepts. There is no psychic mechanism,
we should insist, that manufactures concepts from experiences. Onemay be able to “copy” an
experience in imagination, but the copy produced is not a concept. (259)
Conscious experience should be sharply contrasted with the faculties of judgment, representation,
and thought. But likewise, contra the coherentist, Gupta argues that the appearances which
manifest themselves in our conscious experiences do contain a different kind of “given.” This is
not a propositional given (where what is given in conscious experience is propositional content), but
what he terms a “hypothetical given.” What is given to us by our experiences is the ability to
transition from a set of background beliefs about the world (a “view”) to particular rational
judgments about the world. Experience allows us to move from a view to a rational belief without
itself smuggling in any sort of representational content or being structured by preexisting repre-
sentational content. This hypothetical given is what allows Gupta to avoid the problems that
plagued the coherentist and inferentialist positions.
The book then moves from talk of conscious experience to an exploration and analysis of
language and concepts more generally. Here, Gupta explores how our linguistic practices, in
conjunction with our background beliefs and our conscious experiences, can together produce
the kind of rational judgments he is interested in accounting for. Meanwhile, the end of the book
focuses more on the nature of rationality itself, with an exploration of various empirical and
mathematical proofs. A final section on metaphysics and naturalism rounds out the discussion of
how his project connects with larger philosophical concerns.
2. The devil in the details
The first major worry I have with Gupta’s project involves the fast and loose way that distinctions
and definitions are introduced throughout the book. Gupta’s account is a complex one with all
kinds of intricatemoving parts: appearances, presentational complexes, phenomenological profiles,
hypothetical givens, mental content, subjective identities, concepts, meanings, application conno-
tations, experiences. Each of these moving parts is needed for his account to work. And yet the
relationship between all these parts, and indeedwhat the parts themselves are, is often presented in a
manner far less clear than it needs to be. New terminology and distinctions are introduced at a
breakneck speed throughout the book, and often with insufficient details, justifications, or elabo-
rations necessary for them to do the philosophical work he needs them to. This can, at times, make
his distinctions seem ad hoc or unjustified.
For a simple illustration, take Gupta’s distinction between experience (the presentation of
appearances to consciousness) and intentionality (or mental representation):
Presentation and intentionality, as I conceive them, are radically different aspects of themind.
Presentation is characterized by a certain blending; intentionality by a certain separation.
Each conscious experience presents the subject with a complex of elements, but in a “blended”
manner, a manner that results from the “blending” of a variety of influences. The products of
this blending are manifestations of appearances. Because of the blending, the subject
undergoing an experience may well lack the capacity to parse the presented complex into
its elements. With thought, however, the situation is quite different. One’s thought cannot be
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directed to a complex of elements (e.g. the peach’s being sweet) if one lacks the capacity to
articulate its constituent parts (the peach and sweetness).
Experience and thought are, thus, two radically different, indeed opposite, movements of the
conscious mind. One passively blends the elements together, while the other actively
separates them—or at least strives to do so. (183)
Such a claim is fascinating but is never satisfactorily explained or justified. Even worse, other than
this single brief passage, the claim is simply made and then never returned to again. For such an
important distinction (his very project depends on conscious experience having no intentional or
representational content), a great dealmore is needed here.What ismeant by “actively separates” or
“blends” is left frustratingly vague, and we are given little beyond his say-so to conclude that the two
processes must be different. This is especially worrying given that we have good reasons to deny
such claims. For instance, compositionality is often taken to be an essential feature of thought and
representation and, by its very nature, involves the blending of elements together rather than
actively separating them. Thoughts are blended together to form more complex thoughts. Words
are blended together to form complex sentences. Simple neural representations are bound together
to form far more complex ones. So what justifies this insistence that thought and representation
must be the opposite of blending?
Or take his insistence that “one’s thought cannot be directed to a complex of elements if one lacks
the capacity to articulate its constituent parts.” Why should we accept this claim at face value?
Examples abound in which a particular word is unknown to a reader but is given meaning when
placed in the context of a sentence.We thus seem very capable of directing our thought to a complex
of elements (i.e., the entire collection of words forming a sentence) evenwhen one lacks the capacity
to articulate some of its constituent parts (i.e., some of the words contained in that sentence). Of
course, a great deal hangs on exactly what is meant by “constituent parts,” “capacity,” and
“articulate.” (I suspect that many can understand some event as ironic even if they cannot articulate
exactly what “irony” is, for example.) But this is precisely the point. Without more elaboration and
clarity, we are left simply with a short passage that makes bold controversial claims with insufficient
evidential and philosophical support. While some of his essential concepts and distinctions are
given a great deal of care and discussion, far toomany others are not. And it is with those that I often
found myself taking issue. His vagueness can make it exceedingly difficult to make sense of what
distinctions he is trying tomake in those instances andwhetherwe have good reason to accept them.
This lack of justification for some of his key concepts leads to my second criticism.
3. What neuroscience and cognitive science have to offer
The other major worry I have with Gupta’s project is his lack of engagement with contemporary
cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology. In his defence, this is very much a deliberate
decision on Gupta’s part, as he is interested in a logical inquiry of consciousness that will allow him
to develop his project independent of what one might want to say about neuroscience, or even
naturalism and physicalismmore generally. But the fact that the book doesn’t engage with research
from these scientific domains is to its detriment. This is not because the questions it explores are
entirely empirical or because they can be adequately solved by those scientific domains, but because
those domains provide different and powerful conceptual resources for thinking about the nature of
phenomena like conscious experience, phenomenology, mental content, rationality, and thought.
By limiting himself to the very particular ways in which certain twentieth-century analytic
philosophers have approached such phenomena, he immediately limits the sorts of logical inquiry
available to him.
In order for Gupta’s project to work, there must be a sharp divide between conscious experience
and things likemental content, judgment, andmeaning. If our experiences contained content about
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the world and are used to provide rational support for a perceptual judgment, thenwe either fall into
the direct acquaintance trap (in which the content of our conscious experience is due to some
mystical propositional “given”) or the coherentist trap (where the content of our conscious
experience is entirely imposed on it by our preexisting collection of rationally connected beliefs
and, thus, cannot itself provide rational support for those beliefs). To avoid the two horns of this
dilemma, experience itself must have no content. It only acts as ameans of transitioning from a view
to a rational belief.
So what then is conscious experience? For Gupta, conscious experience is a complex combina-
tion of appearances.Appearances are intended to be, roughly speaking, the subjective way in which
something appears to an observer. More specifically, appearancesmanifest themselves to a person’s
consciousness based on how that person is situated in the world.When staring at a piece of paper in
a particular light and from a particular angle, a particular appearance will be manifested to the
observer. To change the angle at which we look at the paper, the lighting we see it in, or even the
distance we stand from it will change its appearance. Appearances are often characterized by Gupta
as something like pure phenomenology. He says, for example, “the phenomenology of an experi-
ence is constituted not by the qualities and relationships presented in the experience, but by the
appearances manifested in it” (161).
However, in order to deny that experiences have mental content, there must be some clear
demarcation between what sort of mental events count as contentful and what sort don’t. Gupta
often gives the impression that by “mental content” he means something akin to a robust full-
blooded doxastic state. Anything less than this is not sufficient to count as genuinemental content.2
Indeed, there is a long philosophical tradition of thinking of mental content in this way. But one of
the major insights brought to us by domains such as computational neuroscience, cognitive
neuroscience, and cognitive psychology is that mental content, judgments, representations, and
phenomenology may not be all or nothing affairs.
Let us suppose that forming a mental representation of a cup in your mind counts as an instance
of a contentful mental state.What about the edge-detecting neurons that encode information about
the individual lines thatmake up yourmental representation of that cup?Do they contain “content”
about edges? These neurons do not merely respond to edges in our visual field but can encode
information regarding those edges and then transmit this information downstream. This infor-
mation can then be integrated with information provided from other neurons which encode
information about different spatial and extensional characteristics, binding together to form the
mental representation which, in turn, can be bound with other complex representations to form
thoughts, sentences, etc. (e.g., Eliasmith and Anderson 2003; Eliasmith 2013). Are these individual
neurons making judgments about the way the world is (“that’s an edge over there!”)? Do they
2For instance, he tells us that in order for something to count as genuine mental content, it must be “the sort of thing that can
be assessed for truth and falsity or for accuracy or inaccuracy” (196n12). It is interesting to note that this claim seems to be oddly
in conflict with other claims hemakes later on in chapter 8. There, he discusses an example in which a particular name, “Leena,”
may fail to denote, but may still be meaningful to a given linguistic community:
“Leena,” though it lacks a denotation, was (and remains) ameaningful symbol in the community’s discourse; it expresses
a concept, albeit a defective one. If meaningfulness is understood as possession of meaning, then meaning is not
denotation; for lack of denotation does not imply lack of meaning. Meaningful use of a term depends only partly, and
sometimes not at all, on denotation. It depends also on view and experience, and these can render uses of a term
meaningful even when the term denotes nothing. (252)
But, of course, individual terms, names, and concepts are not the sorts of things that can be assessed for truth and falsity, or
for accuracy or inaccuracy (the sentence “That is Leena over there” may be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, but the mere
name “Leena” is itself neither true nor false, accurate nor inaccurate, regardless of whether it denotes). And so under his
previous definition of content, “Leena” cannot be a contentful symbol. Is there an important difference to be drawn between
“contentful” and “meaningful”? If so, no such distinction is ever discussed. We are left merely to guess. And yet such a
distinction would seem to have huge implications for his project.
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represent? Certainly, the content being processed by an edge-detecting neuron falls well short of a
full-blooded concept like “cup,” but it would be equally as inappropriate to dismiss it as containing
nothing resembling content at all. What we are left with is something less than what many
philosophers have been comfortable calling “content,” but still importantly content-like in many
essential ways (since they are essential representational components of the sorts of things that are
uncontroversially considered “content”). We are left in a gray area of almost contents, or not quite
contents, or nascent embryonic contents. They are a kind of quasi-pseudo-semi-contents (hereafter:
contentsq-p-s).
We can tell a very similar story regarding inferences.Whether a particular sound is interpreted as
a word is partially determined by sounds that came before and after it. Your brain will often
interpret a sound as a word depending on the other auditory cues it receives. Does the brain infer
that the sound heardmust be a word based on the fact that the other auditory cues it receives are also
thought to be words? Certainly “inference”may be too strong a term here. And so we are left with
something potentially inference-like in some very primitive but essential ways. Neither a full-
blooded inference, but not nothing either. More importantly, the difference between these
contentsq-p-s or inferencesq-p-s and full-blooded CONTENTS or INFERENCES, may ultimately
be a difference of degree and not a difference of kind. There may be no clear demarcation to make
between the two—no point where the quasi-pseudo-semi ends and the full-blooded begins.
As a field, computational neuroscience deals in exactly this gray area of quasi-pseudo-semi-
contents, representationsq-p-s, meaningsq-p-s, judgmentsq-p-s, experiencesq-p-s, and inferencesq-p-s.
Yet Gupta does not, and this is precisely where his account becomes problematic. Can we pull apart
things like “presentational complexes,” “appearances,” “judgments,” “denotations,” and “inferen-
tial roles” from one another in a clear-cut way? Gupta’s project requires that such clean demar-
cations exist and can be located. But modern cognitive science provides an entirely new set of
conceptual tools for thinking about such things, and forces us to consider positions in the logical
space of possibilities that Gupta does not acknowledge.
To illustrate, consider that Gupta wants to draw a sharp divide between appearances and
representational content. Gupta nicely lays out the potential worries and problems that have
plagued historical attempts to collapse appearances entirely into representational content, as well
as attempts to collapse representational content entirely into appearances. From this, he concludes
that we need to keep the two entirely separate and distinct from one another. But this simply does
not follow. Take, as an analogy, the nature versus nurture debate in psychology. Certainly, one
might argue that attempts to collapse all biological influences on behaviour into mere environ-
mental influences would be foolish, as would attempts to collapse all environmental influences into
biological ones. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude from such a failure that we therefore must
assume that nature and nurture are entirely distinct influences, completely divorced and separate
from one another. On the contrary, modern biology and epigenetics tells us that biological factors
and environmental factors cannot and do not influence behaviour abstracted away from each other
(e.g., Strohman 2000). For a particular biological influence on behaviour to be a biological influence
on behaviour, it must interact with the environment in very particular ways and under particular
conditions. Otherwise, the influences do not manifest at all. Likewise, for some particular envi-
ronmental input to influence the behavior of a system, that system must be constructed in very
particular ways to allow complex interaction between biology and environment. In other words, the
very distinction between nature and nurture is itself the problem.We do not simply collapse one set
of influences into the other so much as realize that the two sets of influences were never entirely
distinct from one another to begin with. The relationship between the different influences is far
richer, more complex, and interdependent than initially thought. Nature and nurture bleed into one
another and blur together. The distinctions between things like conscious experience, intention-
ality, phenomenology, and judgment may similarly blur together in exactly this manner.We do not
collapse one into another so much as understand the nuanced and complex ways in which all of
these thingsmay be interdefined and inextricably linked with one another at the quasi-pseudo-semi
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level. Gupta simply does not consider such an option, remaining staunchly entrenched in tradi-
tional philosophical outlooks that have conceptualized and characterized these things in very
particular, and often very rigid, ways. It is here that the conceptual resources of domains such as
computational and cognitive neuroscience may prove helpful, even essential, to the project on offer.
To further elaborate, consider the distinction between denotational and inferentialist accounts of
meaning. Gupta argues that while some cases of meaning may be determined by the inferential role
that the linguistic term plays, other cases of meaning may well be based on denotation:
Wittgenstein’s and Sellar’s rejection of Russell’s notion of acquaintance is reasonable, as also
is their rejection of the Russellian (and Tractarian) identification ofmeaning with denotation.
Still, why deny denotation all role in meaning? Why deny that some linguistic items
sometimes bear a denotation relation to some elements of the world and, furthermore, that
this relationship can be important for understanding some uses of language? (227)
Moreover, he suggests that there may bemany different ways in which words gain their meaning
(of which denotation, and inferential role, are only some):
Even though I allow that some terms may denote world items. I do not impose it as a
requirement on meaningfulness that at least some terms do so. The presence of primitive
denoting terms is not a prerequisite for meaningfulness. I recognize that there is a variety of
language-world relations, beyond “denotation” and “true of,” that is useful in understanding
the functioning of language and thought. (238–39)
But the problem with this way of characterizing things is that it assumes that there is a collection of
entirely distinct language-world relations and that different situations result in different language-
world relations. But just as the solution to the nature versus nurture debate isn’t to conclude that
sometimes it’s only nature and other times it’s only nurture, so too it might be a mistake to assume
that each of these language-world relations must be entirely distinct and simply used in different
contexts. Instead, it might be the case that “denotation,” “true of,” “inferential role,” and others are
all bound together in complicated and inextricable ways. In different contexts, the ways in which
these various elements interact to link language to the world will be different, but all may involve a
complex interaction of these elements to varying degrees.3 This fact would complicate Gupta’s
project in rather extreme ways. In the section to follow, I illustrate how this might happen.
4. Appearances and judgmentsq-p-s
Gupta’s project requires that strong and clear divisions be drawn between things like conscious
experience and judgments. But when we let in the possibility of a far more complex story, one in
which there are only shades of gray instead of black-and-white distinctions, then some of the key
moves hewishes tomake become less plausible. To illustrate, one essential feature of Gupta’s project
is that what is manifest to consciousness are appearances. These appearances have no content and
involve no judgment. His account notes the following essential features of appearances (213):
(v) Appearances can be grouped in families (e.g. visual appearances and touch appearances)
and in various classes (e.g. color and shape appearances).
3The brain is massively interconnected, with shared neural circuits being used and repurposed for carrying out a host of
complex kinds of cognitive tasks under different conditions (e.g., Hohwy 2007; Dehaene and Cohen 2007; Anderson, 2007,
2008, 2010; Patterson and Plaut, 2009; Churchland and Churchland 2013; Heyes 2018). The fact that the brain is a huge
collection of interconnected information processing systems means that there simply might not be the sort of clear and rigid
demarcations that Gupta insists there must be.
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(vi) Appearances stand in various relations of comparative similarity to one another. A color
appearance may be more similar to another color appearance than to a third one with
respect to, say, lightness but not with respect to hue.
(vii) Appearances may be complex, structured items. When one looks at a yellow bird, the bird
manifests a complex appearance that is constituted of, among others, some color appear-
ances and some shape appearances. If appearance a is constituent of appearance a*, then
necessarily whenever a* is manifested so also is a.
The central point is that appearances can be compared along different subjective dimensions. To
further illustrate, consider the following example presented by Gupta. Imagine you are presented
with three different objects: two spheres of exactly the same size but different colours (one blue, the
other yellow), and a cube with the same colour as one of the spheres. He notes the following when
comparing these objects:
The presentation of the three objects to your consciousness are not subjectively identical; the
appearances the object manifest to you are all different. Nevertheless, the presentations of the
two spheres are subjectively identical along certain dimensions—the shape and size dimen-
sions, as we might put it. Also, the presentation of the second sphere and the cube are also
subjectively identical along a certain different dimension—the color dimension, as we might
put it. The example shows that there are fine-grained notions of subjective identity—
subjective-identity-relative-to-dimensions-D and correlated fine-grained notions of appear-
ance. (158)
But let’s take a moment to understand how such comparisons are possible. First, why does the
colour of the cube and one of the spheres appear subjectively identical? There aremany examples in
which the same colour, in the same lighting conditions, from the same angle, and at the same
distance will appear different based upon the context in which it is embedded. As a classic example,
consider the visual illusion in Figure 1.
In the left-hand image, the colour appearance of square A is subjectively different from the
colour appearance of square B (i.e., their appearances differ along the subjective dimension of
colour). But in the right-hand image, the appearance of square A and B are identical along the
colour dimension. Yet, square A and B are in fact the same shade of gray in both images. So what’s
going on here?
It turns out that your brain ismaking all sorts of “best guesses” regardingwhat colour you’re looking
at based on how the squares are situated in the checkerboard pattern that they are embedded in, the
lighting cast over the board, and the shadow being cast by the cylinder among other things. Based on
this, we can “fool” your brain by artificially manipulating these features to influence how the brain will
Figure 1. Edward H. Adelson’s Checker-Shadow Illusion (Thomson and Macpherson 2017)
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9
construct themental image. Put anotherway, the appearance is determined by all kinds of “judgments,”
or if you prefer: judgmentsq-p-s, being made by low-level visual processing mechanisms in your brain.
This includes judgmentsq-p-s aboutwhere the boundaries of each square are, where the cylinder is on the
checkerboard, what the boundary of the cylinder is, how the shadow is being cast by the cylinder, which
parts of the checkerboard are in shadow and which are not, etc. The brain does not know what is out
there and somustmake all kinds of judgmentsq-p-s about what it thinks ismost likely out there given the
limited stimuli it receives (for more, see Eliasmith 2005). All these judgmentsq-p-s are then used to
construct a representation that has the appearance of square A and square B being different on the left,
but not the right.
Here then is the point: the different subjective dimensions along which we compare various
appearances may be inextricably interwoven with, and constituted in large part by, the collection of
judgmentsq-p-s being made by various neural mechanisms of the brain (and the contentq-p-s they
provide). These judgmentsq-p-s and contentsq-p-s regarding edge detection, lighting, spatial orientation
andmore, may be the very thing that allows appearances to be complex and to have various different
subjective dimensions. Or put another way, appearances may be constitutively intertwined with
judgmentsq-p-s and contentq-p-s, and it is precisely this intertwining that constitutes the complex array
of different subjective dimensions that appearances have, and that we are then able to compare.
In response, Gupta might protest that I’ve confused his project of logical inquiry for one of
naturalistic explanation. Neuroscience and cognitive science are concerned primarily with the
naturalist project of explaining how the brain works within the confines of naturalism and
physicalism. But he is not interested in such a project. He is interested in the project of logical
inquiry—one which can account for how conscious experience provides rational support for our
empirical beliefs and judgments independent of what a naturalistic story might say:
The account of conscious experience I shall offer is meant to serve the logical inquiry, not the
naturalist one. [. . .] My sole concern is to find an account of conscious experience that helps
make sense of empirical reasoning and of reasonableness of view. It is plain that conscious
experience plays some role here. What is this role? And what is it about conscious experience
that enables it to play this role? These are the questions that will concern me, not the question
of the naturalist standing of conscious experience. (3)
But this sort of response would be to miss the point of my argument. I’m not suggesting that we
ought to accept the conceptual frameworks proposed by the cognitive sciences because they fit
within a naturalist framework. I’m arguing instead that these frameworks may provide a better
conceptual foundation for a logical inquiry into how things like consciousness, rational judgment,
and empiricism relate than the one that Gupta chooses to presuppose.
To assume that the value of the cognitive sciences stems exclusively from their ability to provide a
naturalistic account of the physical mechanisms of the brain is to underestimate, and to do a
disservice to, the important philosophical, conceptual, and logical contributions that those domains
provide. The cognitive sciences provide us with new conceptual resources for thinking about the
relationship between various mental states, capacities, and processes. Using these as our conceptual
starting point for a logical inquiry into how consciousness contributes to rational judgment is no
less justified than using those Gupta starts with. On the contrary, theymay be far better equipped to
deal with the complexities and obstacles that Gupta’s project faces. His lack of engagement with the
sciences of the mind is problematic because it means that he simply does not consider various
options that those domains conceptually open up to him, and this, in turn, limits the sorts of logical
inquiry that is available to him. The fact that the conceptual tools provided by the cognitive sciences
were developed as part of a naturalist project is not the issue, the effectiveness of those tools in
understanding the nature and relation of rational judgment and consciousness is.
Gupta’s overly rigid conceptualization of judgments and appearances is what leads him to
quickly dismiss the idea of a gray area where these things may intermingle:
10 Eric Hochstein
It is true that experience is not a simple effect of the actions of the world on the mind. It is a
product of complex operations, operations that may well be influenced by beliefs and other
mental states. This general fact has no tendency to show, however, that presentation depends
on concepts or judgment. To establish the dependence, some specific ideas must be brought
into play about the role of concepts and judgments in experience.
(ii) The specific idea on which the objection builds—namely, that concepts and judgments
play a role in the synthesis of the manifold of sensations—is open to different interpretations,
for the term “sensation” is highly ambiguous. Two readings of “sensation” are especially
relevant here. On one reading, “sensation” means particular outputs of sense organs, and
these outputs may be (e.g.) patterns of neural firing. Now, it is likely that no experience is
possible without some bringing together, some synthesis, of these outputs. Sowe can plausibly
say that some kind of synthesis of sensations underlies experience. The character of this
synthesis is obscure, however, and that it occurs provides no grounds for thinking that
concepts and judgments play any role in it. Hence, on the current reading of “sensation,” we
have no reason to think that the presentation of an object in experience depends on concepts
or judgments. (180)
Gupta tells us that the character of the synthesis that underlies sensations is obscure, and thus
provides no evidence for thinking concepts and judgments play a role in it. But its obscurity may
stem from the fact that he simply refuses to engage with the very scientific disciplines that are
explicitly dedicated to making this process less obscure and which can provide the conceptual tools
needed to do so.
Likewise, while it might be true that the presentation of appearances in experience does not
depend on full-blooded concepts and judgments, it might very well depend on conceptsq-p-s and
judgmentsq-p-s. And these may not be different in kind from full-blooded concepts and judgments,
only in degree. The fact that Gupta does not consider the possibility of this gray area leads him to
assume that there must be clear-cut distinctions and boundaries out there to be found. And yet this
may reflect the limitations of his logical inquiry more than it does any sort of insight about the
relation of conscious experience to judgment. The tools of modern cognitive science provide a
means of exploring the complexity of exactly these issues; Gupta just chooses not to employ them.
But what of rationality? Gupta’s central aim in the book is to provide an empirical grounding and
justification for rational judgments. The alternative account I am suggesting seems to make such a
project substantiallymore difficult.What dowe say about the rational status of a judgment whenwe
choose to wander through this gray area of quasi-judgments, pseudo-inferences, and semi-contents?
Is rationality itself something that loses its full bloodedness under this account only to be replaced
with something quasi-pseudo-semi in nature? Is there only RATIONALITY, or can there be
varying degrees of rationalityq-p-s? I want to suggest that the latter may well be the case.
Part of Gupta’s criticism of both acquaintance models and coherence models of conscious
experience is that neither seems to give an adequate account of the rational justification of a belief or
judgment. Under one account, the process by which judgments gain their rational status is almost
mystical; on the other, rationality must be presupposed in order for conscious experience to provide
any role in learning about the world (and thus cannot be grounded in such experiences). Neither are
satisfactory. How can the account I’m suggesting fare any better? Part of the problem is that both
horns of the dilemma are rooted in particular ways of conceptualizing rationality, judgment, and
experience. If the accounts proposed by modern neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science
are taken seriously, then all of these thingsmay need to be reconceived. In the gray area of the quasi-
pseudo-semis, the relationship between judgment, world, experience, and rationality are far more
interdependent and interrelated. Contra the acquaintance model, there is no special propositional
“given” that we get from conscious experience because conscious experience is not a wholly distinct
kind of process with its own unique nature and special content. Conversely, coherentism does not
simply impose all meaning on conscious experience by starting with full-blooded rational beliefs,
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since this too assumes a hard divide between conscious experience and rational beliefs. But if these
are not as wholly distinct or full blooded as we take them to be, then neither option is appropriate.
None of this makes the general project of understanding rationality impossible or suggests that it
is not a worthwhile project. It merely changes the way in whichwemust go about this project. There
is a story to be told about rationality, empiricism, and the relationship betweenmind andworld. But
the way that story is told might look nothing like the kind that would allowGupta to help himself to
the concepts and distinctions he insists upon. Learning to walk in the gray area can be daunting, but
it may be our best place to look for answers.
5. Conclusion
Gupta’s project is fascinating, and there are many features of his story that I find very compelling.
But it requires drawing very particular hard and fast demarcations that only seem plausible when
strictly employing the conceptual tools and resources from twentieth-century analytic philosophy,
and not when we supplement these conceptual tools and resources with those of modern neuro-
science, psychology, and cognitive science. His decision not to engage with this literature is
somewhat puzzling. These scientific domains provide compelling reasons for questioning whether
there are any clear or hard-edged distinctions to be found when it comes to things like: conscious
and unconscious (e.g., Wilkes 1984; Churchland 1988), denotational and inferential (e.g., Blouw
and Eliasmith 2018), or judgment and experience (Barwich 2017). Instead, these may all exist in a
gray area where things become less full blooded or robust and more quasi-pseudo-semi in nature,
where they become less distinct from one another andmore intertwined and interconnected. In this
gray area, the details of the story that Gupta wishes to tell become less plausible. His story requires
clear demarcations where none may be found.
Like any great piece of philosophical work, Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry is conten-
tious, thought provoking, and challenging. This is what makes philosophical works worth reading.
The challenges that I have presented in this critical notice are not intended to tear down Gupta’s
project, but to hopefully provide a way forward for further work. It is precisely to the gray areas of
neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science that Gupta needs to go next. Can the account he
provides be made to fit with the results of those domains in a straightforward way? Those who
champion Gupta’s cause have a great deal of space to explore here, either by showing how his
account can be made to fit with those domains or by showing how those domains need to be
supplemented with Gupta’s philosophical analysis. Similarly, those who find Gupta’s account
unpersuasive should likewise venture into the gray areas, since it is there where they may find
their best weapon against him. Either way, there is a clear way forward for both those who support
and those reject the project on offer here.
EricHochstein is a professor of philosophy at theUniversity of Victoria. His research focuses on issues related to the history and
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